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Structured Abstract: 
Purpose – To guarantee alignment between ongoing activities and organizational goals, 
innovation management theory emphasizes management control and explicit innovation 
strategies as prerequisites for innovation performance. However, the theory on open services 
innovation emphasizes individual autonomy and incentives to foster open innovations. In this 
paper, we explore this inconsistency. 
Design/methodology/approach – We follow an explorative research design involving 25 
semi-structured interviews in 5 large scale-intensive service firms. Scale-intensive service 
firms are strategically sampled for this study since these firms experience tension between 
open service innovation characteristics and efforts to standardize.    
Findings – We show how individual autonomy facilitates the internal and external networking 
required in open innovations. However, individualized incentives do not suffice to motivate, 
mobilize and direct the collaboration and collective effort needed to ensure successful 
implementation of open innovation processes. Innovation performance is a collective effort, 
and our findings suggest that firms’ business strategy works as a collective incentive system.  
Practical limitations/implications – Our findings imply that firms should not rely on 
individualized incentives alone to implement open innovation processes successfully. The 
implementation of more collectively oriented incentives is also necessary to motivate the 
collective effort required to succeed with open innovation.    
Originality/value – We extend Foss et al. (2011) and show how innovation practices are 
collective efforts that also involve the mobilization of external resources. The incentives 
observed have an effect on individual behaviour while performance measures to a larger 
degree cater to the collective level. We present three propositions for further empirical 
investigation. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the tension between individual autonomy and managerial control. This 
tension is becoming increasingly relevant for firms involved in open innovation activities. 
Innovation is increasingly highlighted as the main factor in surviving competition, and open 
innovation is suggested as the solution to achieve high innovation performance 
(Chesbrough, 2003). According to Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004), consumers today have 
more choices of products and services than ever before, but they seem dissatisfied. Firms 
invest in greater product variety but are less able to differentiate themselves. As competition 
intensifies and profit margins shrink, managers are under overwhelming pressure to enable 
innovation by utilizing innovation resources external to the firm as well as carefully aligning 
the firm with its environment.  
 
The extant innovation management theory (e.g. de Jong, Bruins, Dolfsma, and Meijgaard, 
2003) is, however, not consistent in its description of how innovation practices are created to 
ensure sustained innovation performance. Kahn, Barczak, and Moss (2006) are normative 
and suggest that a clearly defined innovation strategy is a prerequisite condition for high 
performance of innovations. Foss, Laursen, and Pedersen (2011), on the other hand, 
suggest that individual incentives are a prerequisite for ensuring sustained innovation 
performance by fostering innovative organizational practices. Their emphasis on individual 
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incentives is linked to individual autonomy, since the increasingly open innovation activities 
intensify the collaborative effort between autonomous employees and the external resources 
involved.  
 
Conversely, fostering individual autonomy and increased managerial control to ensure 
alignment between ongoing activities and organizational goals are contradictory. There is a 
tension between the increased individual autonomy to communicate freely with external and 
internal stakeholders and the increased managerial attention and control to guarantee 
alignment between ongoing activities and organizational goals. In many ways, innovation and 
management control functions represent two contradictory logics. Innovation represents a 
phenomenon that is open, emergent, chaotic and unpredictable (Perrin, 2002), whilst 
management control activities are more closed, planned, formal and predictable (Merchant 
and Van der Stede, 2007).  
 
Echoing these differences, there has been a discussion in the innovation literature related to 
whether management control has the ability to help or hinder innovation, often referred to as 
the “help or hinder debate” (Akroyd, Narayan, and Sridharan, 2009). This discussion has 
resulted in two separate research streams: one arguing that management control helps 
innovation (Cooper, 2001) and one arguing that management control hinders innovation 
(Amabile, 1998). This paper aims to build a bridge between these discrete research streams 
and extend the insight from Foss et al. (2011) by addressing the following research question: 
How are innovation practices incentivized and controlled to ensure the successful 
implementation of open innovation processes? 
 
In this paper, our aim is to contribute to filling this gap by exploring the practice of innovation 
in one specific subset of services: scale-intensive services. Scale-intensive services are 
standardized services produced on a large scale mainly by large firms. Examples are bank 
services, insurance services, telecommunication services and logistics services (Pavitt, 
1984). 
 
2. Theory 
According to the innovation management literature (Froehle and Roth, 2007; Kahn, et al., 
2006) and the Product Development and Management Association (PDMA) certification work 
(PDMA, 2006, 2012), an important dimension of service innovation management is strategy. 
Innovation strategy refers to the articulation of the role of innovation in achieving the 
organizational goals (Cooper, Edgett, and Kleinschmidt, 2001) by aligning the overall 
business strategy with the innovation decisions (Menor and Roth, 2007). Other research 
streams emphasize that innovation is becoming increasingly open (Chesbrough, 2011; 
Chesbrough, Bouquet, and Barsoux, 2011; Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Chesbrough (2003) 
introduces the concept of “open innovation”, stating that firms should use external as well as 
internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as they aim to advance their 
technology and value proposition. A main characteristic of open innovations is that it involves 
multiple actors who act in a world of changing objectives (Fung, Fung, and Wind, 2007; 
Westerlund and Leminen, 2011). Hence, open innovations eliminate the organizational 
boundary of the in-company and out-company origins of innovation. This view is also 
supported by Vargo and Lusch (2004). They suggest that value creation is intimately linked 
to client interaction and less connected to the protection of property rights. Thus, central to 
their service-dominant logic is the proposition that the customer becomes a co-creator of 
value (Payne, Storbacka, and Frow, 2008). 
 
That service innovation is positively related to co-production is empirically confirmed by 
Chen, Tsou, and Ching (2011). A service innovation is a new service experience or service 
solution that consists of one or several of the following dimensions: a new service concept, 
new customer interaction, new value system/business partners, new revenue mode or new 
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organizational or technological service delivery system (Hertog, van der Aa, and de Jong, 
2010). However, it is not explained which strategy requirements an open service innovation 
approach entails. Chesbrough (2003) describes an open innovation funnel with a “fuzzy front 
end” that implicitly requires strategy to prioritize innovation activities, resource mobilization 
and incremental or radical innovations across current and new markets.  
 
Moreover, the increased openness and client-centricity create institutional constraints on the 
organization. Foss, et al. (2011, 996) emphasize this point when they propose that the drive 
for client-centricity empowers individuals to interact more autonomously with the 
organization’s external environment as boundary-spanning individuals (Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001). These individuals need incentives and decision rights to engage in such 
boundary-spanning activities, as well as the possibility to communicate easily with the focal 
firm. Foss et al. (2011, p. 980) explicitly state that there is “some evidence to suggest that 
companies increasingly are changing their internal organization toward greater delegation of 
authority and better communication within the firm (particularly along the lateral dimension) 
and performance incentives (e.g. Zenger and Hesterly, 1997).”  
 
In particular, Foss et al. (2011) recommend increased emphasis on organizations’ individual 
incentive systems as prerequisites for good innovation practices whereby firms attempt to 
leverage user and customer knowledge in the context of innovation: “through the use of new 
organizational practices, notably, intensive vertical and lateral communication, rewarding 
employees for sharing and acquiring knowledge, and high levels of delegation of decision 
rights” (Foss, et al., 2011, 980). The authors define incentive systems as “work practices that 
enhance internal information flows and give motivation (incentives) and latitude (delegation). 
Moreover, the focus on delegation, internal communication, and incentives allows for a focus 
on the factors that directly affect the behaviour of given employees. Improving the skills of 
the pool of employees is much more long term in nature and is not so directly related to 
social behaviour within the organization” (Foss et al., 2011). In their review of the extant 
literature on innovation, they identify a variety of descriptions of individual incentives used in 
organizations: incentive plans/profit sharing, formal appraisals, merit-based promotion 
(Huselid, 1995); line incentives (Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997); incentive pay 
(Ichniowski and Shaw, 1999); decision architecture (Mendelson, 2000); skill-based pay, 
group-based pay, performance-based promotion and employee stock ownership (Guthrie, 
2001). Thus, Foss et al. (2011) illustrate how individual behaviour can be incentivized. 
However, the authors do not discuss incentives aiming at the collective level. The motivation 
for individuals’ behaviour can differ if collaboration is required to harvest profit. 
 
To summarize, innovation management theory emphasizes management control and explicit 
innovation strategies as prerequisites for innovation performance, while the theory on open 
innovation emphasizes individual autonomy and incentives to foster interaction with the 
external environment. In the following, we empirically explore this tension by focusing on 
practices of service innovation in scale-intensive service firms. The practice angle is 
particularly chosen to enlighten the study with respect to variation between collective and 
individual incentives. To emphasize practices, we turn to practice theories, in which practices 
are conceived as “embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally 
organized around shared practical understanding” (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny, 
2001, p. 2). Practices comprise multiple people and their activities, being a social 
phenomenon (Schatzki, 2012). The understanding of practices is inspired by organizational 
and management studies (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson, Melin, 
and Whittington, 2003; Orlikowski, 2002) and sociological theorizing about the character of 
society and human action (Schatzki et al., 2001). Exploring innovation practices involves 
uncovering the patterns several individuals form when their activities are related to 
innovation.  
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3. Methodology 
The study is based on empirical case materials derived from interviews in five large 
international scale-intensive service firms (Pavitt, 1984). In preparation for the interviews, a 
questioner guide was developed and based on the PDMA glossary (PDMA, 2006). The five 
participating firms were theoretically sampled (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 
2011) to shed light on issues related to the balance between managerial control and 
individual autonomy.  
 
Scale-intensive services are standardized services that are produced on a large scale mainly 
by large firms. Examples include bank, insurance, telecommunication and logistics services 
(de Jong, et al., 2003; Pavitt, 1984). These services have some characteristics that 
distinguish them from other services: e.g., they are often dependent on physical networks or 
information and communication technology (ICT) networks (Soete and Miozzo, 1989). Scale-
intensive service firms are particularly relevant to this study as these firms standardize and 
harvest from scale advantages and thus to a large extent experience the effect of the tension 
between open and client-centric innovations and the organizations’ needs to align activities. 
 
The five scale-intensive service firms selected operated in both business-to-consumers and 
business-to-business markets. Alpha and Epsilon are in the insurance industry, Beta is in the 
telecommunications industry, Gamma is in the financial services industry and Delta is a 
state-owned limited company within the logistics and mail services industry.  
 
Data were collected during 25 semi-structured interviews lasting between 1 and 2 hours. The 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. The units of analysis are service innovation 
projects. To reflect both the strategy and the innovation practices of the firms, informants with 
different roles, and from different firm levels, were chosen: managers and business 
development and IT specialists.  
-------------------------------- 
 
Insert Table I about here 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
There were also more frequent interactions between the research group and the five key 
informants, one from each of the participating firms. The key informants functioned as 
liaisons between the researchers and the respective firms and they were involved in the 
identification of informants. The data were inserted into NVivo and coded.  
 
In order to make sense of the data, the analysis progressed in several stages. First, the 
material was thoroughly discussed, summarized in PowerPoint and presented to selected 
employees and managers in the firms to validate the data’s veracity and enhance the 
trustworthiness of the analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Second, the material was 
scrutinized in the light of the research questions. We uncovered how the innovation practices 
were incentivized on the one hand and how they were controlled on the other hand. In this 
way, we were able to detect how individual autonomy was enabled, whether incentives to 
foster open innovations were present and how management control and explicit innovation 
strategies were involved. Third, we contrasted the findings with the existing theory.  
 
4. Findings 
We first report the open innovation practices found in our case firms. Thereafter, we report 
our findings related to i) the individual autonomy and incentives to foster open innovations 
and ii) management control and explicit innovation strategies as prerequisites for innovation 
performance. We use illustrative quotes to demonstrate the findings. 
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4.1 Open innovation practices  
We found that the employees responsible for innovation mobilized both internal and external 
resources to accelerate the innovation process and to ensure successful realization of their 
innovation efforts. This practice may be illustrated by the following statements from two 
employees:   
 
Networking and creating ownership are extremely important. Even with the top 
manager in Sweden, with 400,000 customers, even she said yes. There is so 
much power. A good internal project manager is one who knows people, and 
networking is extremely important: excessively important. (Employee, Gamma) 
 
[We talk to customers], first and foremost, because decision-making 
processes in these kinds of large companies require that we have a 
relationship [with them]… I think that it helps to talk with them, to have a 
relationship [with them] … so that they will work with us and buy our services. 
Hence, it is important for us to listen to their needs. (Manager, Beta)  
 
Our findings also suggest that being an innovation manager often involves a boundary-
spanning role in which internal and external resources collaborate: 
  
I have “followed the book”, but it has been extremely demanding. It is as if my 
job is a “talking” job, and I go around and talk and talk, and I get so tired of my 
own voice. I meet people and often I’ll ask, “Why don't you talk with him? Why 
don't you know each other?” and they’ll answer “I have never talked to him” 
and I reply “But, I know that he is sitting and working on exactly the same 
things as you do!” I take it for granted that people collaborate; if they don’t, 
then we won’t make it. That is why all of these ideas have been lying there, 
unsolved, because they have not collaborated … So, mainly it is about 
walking around, talking to people and making them talk together. I have faced 
a lot of challenges and have made communities work together that have never 
worked together before. For instance, [there are] two different external 
agencies that do the same job … I have intervened and said “This is not 
working; you have to do the same thing.” I have even tried to make these two 
agencies collaborate on my project … that has been challenging. But, this is 
an example of the kind of iron door that I kick open. (Employee, Alpha) 
 
The findings also indicate that concept and idea generation also occur in relation to the 
external environment:  
 
We are good at capturing the needs that come in early and seeing the core of 
the services. There are many things we're thinking about, such as the backlog 
that we would like to take out, and ideas and suggestions as to what we can 
add and what we can do better. Many are creative for what works for the new 
service innovation and we catch it and get it from sellers. Some of our 
challenge is that there are so many concurring needs, so we have to be strict 
on prioritizing. The difficulty in prioritizing is that we are a relatively small 
group so we cannot tailor-make solutions according to all the wishes and 
identified needs. (Manager, Delta) 
 
4.2 Incentives for innovation activities  
Our findings suggest that individual autonomy and perceived ownership of the innovation 
processes were important for committing to the innovation activities: 
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In my old job we had a way of working that was dramatically different from 
what we saw in many large companies, and that is the typical suggestion box. 
Whether it is digital in using some fancy tools or whether it is a physical box, it 
does not matter. You ask for innovation ideas, and you might get about 2000 
ideas, but no one is doing anything about them. Of course you lose the 
internal commitment then. Then, you have used up the chance. So it's about 
putting the idea generation and development in the system. [...] If you ask 
about good ideas, then it's not taking ownership to not do something with 
those. (Innovation professional, Gamma) 
 
We found a few examples in the case firms of the implementation of explicit individual 
incentives aimed at individual performance and behaviour. An employee of Epsilon, for 
example, stated: 
  
The incentives are individual … such as a performance bonus. (Innovation 
officer, Epsilon)  
 
However, we found very few explicit incentives related to the collective effort needed to 
succeed with open innovation. The practice may be illustrated by the following statement 
from an employee in Beta:  
 
Beta wants to move in a more open direction to the ecosystem we are part of. 
What clearly emerged was that there was no structured process in front, in the 
idea collection. So we have no process to manage ideas, or challenge them 
either, such as how to drive innovation together with other players in the early 
stages. (IT professional, Beta) 
 
Moreover, the current innovation practices do not fully realize the potential from open 
innovations and this is according to the informants related to incentives to share knowledge 
between organizational units and external parties, as illustrated by an employee of Beta: 
  
One of my focus areas has been to answer the following: how to create a 
structured fuzzy front-end process and how to find incentives to share 
innovation-related knowledge, and - thus fuelling fuzzy front-end engine 
incentives. Today there are no incentives to share that knowledge. Thus it 
also stopped in a way. Internally, we are organized in silos with very tight 
bulkheads and only vertical incentives, so they have nothing useful to enable 
cooperation. (IT professional, Beta)  
 
4.3 Management control and explicit strategies for innovation 
Our study reveals a lack of explicit innovation strategies in the case firms. In all the case 
firms, we found that the general business strategy was guiding the decision process related 
to innovation projects. The practices may be illustrated by the following statements:  
  
In our strategy documents, there is nothing about being in front. And we don’t 
have a defined innovation strategy. The work on defining the overall 
innovation strategy or activities was put aside during the financial crisis and 
has not been picked up since then. (Business manager, Alpha) 
 
My experience over the last few years is that seeing ideas and opportunities is 
not the problem. We have a large number of new ideas; the challenge lies in 
taking ideas to commercialization. It is mostly about implementing, prioritizing 
and developing good ideas. (Business developer, Epsilon) 
 
7 
 
We are characterized by a culture that seeks low risk. Innovation and creativity 
are less safe. The priority initiatives are often linked to what we see the 
competitors are doing to succeed. Our culture is a challenge for an innovative 
organization. This is probably the insurance industry; there is little innovation 
in general because core business is the reduction of risk. (Business 
developer, Epsilon) 
 
Our findings also indicate that business relations were not perceived as strategic innovation 
resources:  
 
The standardized customer–supplier model sits very deep in the company, 
and naturally enough it is the one that is rooted in the project model. And it's 
very difficult to make changes there. (IT professional, Beta) 
 
We also found that the innovation measures implemented in the case firms to a large extent 
were generated internally and during the innovation activities, and they were predominantly 
on a project level and not at a strategic level. The following statements from our informants 
illustrate the practice in the case firms: 
  
We've created a strategy for what we can imagine using. The target image 
and a strategy – is to build up some channels that are small today and take 
down the other. [...] In business development, we obtain (innovation) 
management initiatives. It says something about what we should consider, 
and the measures that they believe are important to the company. Then we try 
to create a mandate – what is the purpose of the measure – the resources, 
time, scope and type of impact we believe the initiative can bring. Once that is 
done, we go into a creative idea phase to see what's out of options – create 
hypotheses to see what is possible, technical, marketing and resources [...] So 
we establish a formal project and get resources to manage the project. Then 
there is the development of a project that over time is taken over by the line 
organization and then introduced to the market. (Business developer, Epsilon) 
 
In our culture, we must have quick time to market. But we do not have 
measurements or clear structures to ensure that this will actually succeed. We 
draw a funnel, innovation process with various ports – 100 ideas, 20 cases – 
10 projects – resulting in 4 new services. We tried this but we are not 
systematic. We are actually not successful in measuring this, although we 
tried a few times. (Manager, Alpha) 
 
I am only measured in terms of the deliveries I do: how satisfied the business 
areas are with my delivery. However, I would like to be measured about the 
process innovation. We have no central innovation unit; it is delegated to each 
business unit. (Innovation manager, Alpha)  
 
There are limited performance measures explicitly attached to innovation 
performance. (Manager, Delta) 
 
All the informants, however, perceived their practice in this area as problematic and wanted 
to implement aggregated measures with higher strategic relevance. The general perception 
was that the overall business strategy set the scope for innovation activities and general 
performance measures attended to the overall business performance and hence adhered to 
the collective effort required for innovation activities. 
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To summarize, our findings related to the control of and strategies for innovation activities 
suggest that there are shortcomings in connecting innovation and overall business strategy, 
that there is a lack of explicit innovation strategies and innovation incentives and that there 
are few measures aiming at innovation performance.  
 
5 Discussion 
In this study, we have explored how innovation practices are incentivized and controlled to 
ensure the successful implementation of open innovation processes. We found that 
individual autonomy enables the internal and external networking required in open 
innovations. However, innovation performance requires a collective effort and the existing 
incentives in our cases apply only to individual behaviour. The overall business strategy, on 
the other hand, provides the scope for collective innovation activities, but there are limited 
explicit innovation strategies and few measures aiming explicitly at innovation performance. 
The implication of the study is that individualized incentives do not suffice to motivate and 
direct the required collaboration and collective effort. In contrast, the general performance 
measures capture the collective dimensions better. However, the existing performance 
measures lack relevance to innovation performance and support short-term and revenue-
generating decision making.  
 
Our findings suggest that the incentives for service innovation activities were predominantly 
aimed at individual behaviour. The studied firms used a limited number of measures to 
evaluate the outcomes of their innovation activities and utilized general performance 
measures that to a larger degree evaluated collective performance. Several informants 
stated that their innovation activities involved a boundary-spanning exercise between internal 
and external stakeholders and that the innovation performance was a collective effort. The 
scale-intensive service firms explored did not have explicit innovation strategies but rather 
general business strategies. The employees involved in innovation activities in these scale-
intensive firms exercised considerable autonomy, enabling them to perform the boundary-
spanning role required to coordinate the internal and the external resources that collectively 
contributed to innovation performance.  
 
The findings confirm that the increasing drive for openess and client-centricity in service 
innovations produces a tension between the autonomy of employees engaging in boundary-
spanning innovation activities and the need for management control and alignment between 
innovation activities and organizational goals. Open innovation practices are collective efforts 
and will suffer if performance measures and incentives apply only to individual behaviour. 
These findings suggest that the capacity to enable collective efforts and mobilize both 
external and internal resources are to a limited degree linked to individual incentives but 
more to performance measures that apply to the collective level of the innovation outcomes. 
 
The collective effort is an aspect that is not addressed by Foss et al. (2011) in their argument 
for the prerequisite attention to incentives to foster innovation prerformance. Our findings 
suggest that the incentives aimed to affect individual behaviour do not necessarily align 
individuals’ efforts to enable a collective effort. Thus, we offer the following proposition: 
 
P1: Innovation activities benefit from incentives and performance measures 
that capture innovation activities at the collective level, and not only individual 
behaviour. 
 
The extant innovation management literature suggests that an explicit innovation strategy is 
articulated and that there is a relation between sustained innovation performance and the 
existence of a predefined innovation strategy (Barczak, Kahn, and Moss, 2006; Cooper, et 
al., 2001; Froehle and Roth, 2007; Menor and Roth, 2007). We found that our case firms had 
not defined specific innovation strategies. Instead, the overall business strategy of the case 
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firms gave direction to innovation activities, and based on this we offer the following 
proposition:  
 
P2: The overall business strategy sets the scope for innovation activities and 
general performance measures apply to the collective effort required for 
innovation activities. 
 
Moreover, our findings suggest that measuring and controlling innovation activities in detail 
are difficult, while general innovation outcome measures to some degree capture the 
collectiveness of innovation activities. Performance-oriented management control initiatives 
attend more to outcomes than behaviour, and are thus by nature more collective. Hence, we 
put forward the following proposition:  
 
P3: Explicit innovation strategies, incentives and performance measures 
reduce individualistic behaviour and short-term decision making, enhancing 
innovation performance. 
 
Based on the findings of our study, performance measures that promote innovation practices 
appear to be more relevant to the innovation performance in these large scale-intensive 
service firms than innovation incentives since performance measures capture the collective 
dimensions of innovation practices better than individualized incentives.   
 
Consequently, whereas Foss et al. (2011) raise some important questions with respect to 
individual autonomy, open innovations and incentives, they underemphasize the collective 
and collaborative aspects of innovation practices and the effect of individualized incentives 
on innovation performance. In addition, Foss et al. (2011) highlight the importance of 
connecting innovation practices with management control systems. This study indicates that 
there are existing general perfomance measures aimed at the collective level, but they do not 
directly incentivize improved innovation performance.  
 
6 Conclusion 
The extant theory claims that the increasing drive for openess and client-centricity, especially 
in service innovations, produces a tension between the autonomy of employees engaging in 
boundary-spanning innovation activities and the need for management control and alignment 
between innovation activities and organizational goals. This study reveals how addressing 
the effect of incentives and performance measures on the individual as opposed to the 
collective level can reduce this tension. Open innovation practices are collective efforts and 
will suffer if the performance measures and incentives attend only to individual behaviour. 
The main lesson that can be drawn from this study is that innovation performance benefits 
from incentives and performance measures that facilitate innovation practices at the 
collective level, not only individual innovation behaviour.  
 
There are some obvious limitations to our study. Our explorative research design with its 
limited sample cannot claim generalizability based on statistical representativity. However, 
the strategic sampling of scale-intensive service firms suggests that there is the potential to 
transfer our observations to other types of firms experiencing tension between individual 
autonomy and managerial control. Based on our limited sample, we cannot claim external 
validity for our findings, wheras the internal validity and veracity of our findings are 
maintained as the exploration of the innovation practices involved the multiple roles 
concerned and the process of data analysis allowed for the verification of the findings and 
initial analytic constructs. Futher research should emphasize the testing of the suggested 
propositions in a broader set of scale-intensive firms as well as in firms from other sectors to 
verify the generalizability of our findings.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table I: Data Sources 
 
 
 
Firm Key informants Management Innovation IT Other Total
Alpha 1 1 1 1 4
Beta 1 2 2 2 1 8
Gamma 1 1 1 1 1 5
Delta 1 1 1 1 4
Epsilon 1 1 2 4
Sum 5 6 6 5 3 25
